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The doctrine of impossibility—under which a party is
excused from performing a contract if a supervening event





According to the conventional economic
analysis of this doctrine, courts should not categorically excuse a
party from fulfilling the contract when performance becomes
impossible. Instead, courts should assign the loss caused by non-
compliance to the contracting party who is the best risk bearer
for said loss.
3
As Professors Richard Posner and Andrew
†
Faculty of Law, College of Law & Business. J.S.D. (UC Berkeley); LL.M.
(Columbia University). I am grateful to Ricardo Ben-Oliel, Lisa Bernstein, Hanoch
Dagan, Shahar Dillbary, and Robert Hillman for invaluable comments on earlier drafts
of this article.
1
ROBERTA.HILLMAN, PRINCIPLES OFCONTRACTLAW 354 (3d ed. 2014) (“When a
supervening event, like [a] fire, makes performance impossible, contract law may excuse
performance under the doctrine of ‘impossibility of performance.’”); ERIC A. POSNER,
CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY 160 (2011) [hereinafter POSNER, CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY]
(“Where it is impossible to comply with a condition, the party is excused from compliance.”);
30 SAMUELWILLISTON&RICHARDA. LORD, A TREATISE ON THELAWOFCONTRACTS 366 (4th
ed. 2004) (“A contracting party has no duty to perform an obligation in the agreement if
performance is rendered impossible . . . through no fault of its own . . . .”).
2
Rebecca H. Marek, Continuity for Transatlantic Commercial Contracts After
the Introduction of the Euro, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1985, 2011 n.194 (1998) (“The doctrine
of impossibility is well established in both English and American common law.” (quoting
Gerhard Wagner, In Defense of the Impossibility Defense, 27 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 55, 58
(1995))); John W. Hinchey & Erin M. Queen, Anticipating and Managing Projects:
Changes in Law, CONSTRUCTION LAW., Fall 2006, at 26, 26 (“The doctrine of impossibility
has existed under American and English common law for centuries.”); S. Joe Welborn &
Ryan Stringfellow, “What Do We Do Now”: Advising Your Construction Industry Client
When He Receives a Notice of Default and 48 Hours to Cure, CONSTRUCTION LAW., Winter
2014, at 24, 30 (2014) (same).
3
See, e.g., Richard A. Posner & Andrew M. Rosenfield, Impossibility and Related
Doctrines in Contract Law: An Economic Analysis, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 83, 117 (1977); Marta
Cenini et al., Law and Economics: The Comparative Law and Economics of Frustration in
Contracts, in UNEXPECTED CIRCUMSTANCES IN EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW 33, 34 (Ewoud
Hondius & Christoph Grigoleit eds., 2011) (“Efficiency requires allocating the risk to the
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Rosenfield state in their widely cited article on the impossibility
doctrine, “[E]conomic analysis suggests that the loss should be
placed on the party who is the superior (that is, lower-cost) risk
bearer.”
4
Similarly, in their fundamental book, Professors Robert
Cooter and Thomas Ulen assert, “If the impossibility doctrine in
contract law were efficient . . . it would assign liability to the
party who can bear the risk that performance becomes
impossible at least cost.”
5
The traditional economic analysis furthermore suggests
that the superior risk bearer model is beneficial for both
parties. The logic of this argument is as follows: by assigning
the risk of non-performance to the cheapest risk bearer, the
economic model minimizes the costs of remote risks.
6
In doing
so, the model maximizes the overall surplus from the contract,
which can be divided by the parties.
7
While the theoretical debate over the economic model is
extensive,
8
there are no systematic empirical studies aimed at
directly exposing the parties’ actual preferences for the model.
More specifically, no studies concentrate on the frequency with
parties who can bear it at least cost.”); ROBERT B. COOTER, JR. & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND
ECONOMICS 350 (6th ed. 2014); THOMAS J. MICELI, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO LAW 118
(2d ed. 2009) (economic theory suggests to “assign the risk to the superior risk bearer.”);
Shirley R. Brener, Outgrowing Impossibility: Examining the Impossibility Doctrine in the
Wake of Hurricane Katrina, 56 EMORY L.J. 461, 471 (2006) (noting the superior risk bearer
model is “widely adopted in law and economics circles”); Robert A. Hillman, Contract Excuse
and Bankruptcy Discharge, 43 STAN. L. REV. 99, 107 (1990) (“Economic analysts of law, for
example, posit that courts should allocate the risk of an extraordinary event to the party
better able to insure against it or to avoid it (the ‘superior risk bearer’) . . . .”); Urs Schweizer,
Breach Remedies, Performance Excuses, and Investment Incentives, 28 J.L. ECON. & ORG.
717, 719 (2012) (“An early investigation of performance excuses from the law and
economics perspective is due to Posner and Rosenfield (1977) who suggest that discharge
should be allowed where the promisor is the superior risk bearer.”); Avishai Shachar, From
Income to Consumption Tax: Criteria for Rules of Transition, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1581, 1593
n.52 (1984) (“Economic analysis suggests that the resulting loss should be placed on the
superior risk bearer, that is, the party who can more efficiently insure against the particular
risk in question.” (citing Posner & Rosenfield, supra, at 117)).
4
Posner and Rosenfield, supra note 3, at 117. Notably, according to Google
Scholar, Posner and Rosenfield’s article was cited more than 600 times in scholarly
writing. See Search for “Impossibility and Related Doctrines in Contract Law: An




COOTER, JR. & ULEN, supra note 3, at 350 (emphasis omitted).
6
Id. at 351 (“Interpreting the impossibility doctrine to assign liability to the
lowest-cost risk bearer minimizes the costs of remote risks.”); Cenini et al., supra note
3, at 34–35 (noting under the superior risk bearer model, “the cost of remote risks
would be minimi[z]ed”).
7
COOTER, JR. & ULEN, supra note 3, at 351–52 (“Minimizing the cost of remote
risks maximizes the surplus from the contract, which the parties can divide between
them.”); Cenini et al., supra note 3, at 34–35 (stating the contractual surplus, generated
by the superior risk bearer model, “would be divided between the parties”).
8
See infra notes 47–53 and accompanying text.
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which real-world contracts incorporate this model. This article
aims to fill this research void. Focusing on the preferences of
sophisticated parties to commercial contracts, this article
indicates that the majority of contract parties prefer not to
adopt the economic model.
9
Instead, most parties prefer to be
governed by the doctrine of impossibility, which lacks the
traditional economic calculus.
10
This article is structured as follows: Part I will provide a
theoretical context for the empirical test of this study. First, it
will briefly review the legal impossibility doctrine. Second, it will
present the conventional economic analysis of the doctrine.
Third, it will outline the significant differences between the legal
doctrine and the economic analysis. Part II will present the
empirical test of this study. It will review the data and discuss
the methodology used for empirically testing the preferences of
contract parties for the economic model. It will furthermore
present the results of the test. Part III will respond to potential
criticism of the results.
I. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
A. The Impossibility Doctrine: An Overview
The rule of impossibility may discharge a party from its
contractual obligations if a supervening event prevents its
fulfillment of the contract.
11
For example, assume that an owner
of a music hall promises to allow a musician to use the hall in
order to perform a concert.
12
After the contract is made and just
before the date set for the concert, the hall is destroyed by a fire,
with no fault on the part of the owner. According to the doctrine,
9
See infra Section II.E.
10
See infra Sections I.C, II.E.
11
See sources cited supra note 1.
12
This example is based on the famous case of Taylor v. Caldwell. See Taylor v.
Caldwell (1863) 122 Eng. Rep. 309 (K.B.); see also Curtis Bridgeman, Reconciling Strict
Liability with Corrective Justice in Contract Law, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 3013, 3035 (2007)
(“The most famous impossibility case in which the defendant’s nonperformance was excused
is Taylor v. Caldwell.”). Notably, this case originated the impossibility doctrine. See, JOHN
EDWARD MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 113 (5th ed. 2011), LexisNexis (“The
modern doctrine of impossibility of performance emerged from the case of Taylor v.
Caldwell in 1863.”); Christopher J. Bruce, An Economic Analysis of the Impossibility
Doctrine, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 311, 323 (1982) (“The origin of the doctrine of impossibility lies
in the case of Taylor v. Caldwell.”); Cenini et al., supra note 3, at 34 n.1 (“[Taylor v.
Caldwell] is generally recognised as the first case involving impossibility as a defence . . . .”).
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the owner may be excused from performing his promise since the
fire prevents the fulfilment of said promise.
13
Under the doctrine of impossibility, three central categories
of supervening events may discharge a promisor from the
contract:
14
(1) in a personal service contract, the death of the
promisor, which prevents the performance of the service;
15
(2) a
change of law, after the contract has been made, which legally
prevents compliance with the contract;
16
or (3) the destruction of
the subject matter of the contract—for example by a hurricane,
flood or fire—which renders the fulfillment of the agreement
physically impossible.
17
A promisor who seeks to be excused under the impossibility
rule must meet three central conditions: First, the promisor did not
explicitly agree in the contract to assume the risk that performance
will be prevented by the supervening event.
18
Second, the promisor




HILLMAN, supra note 1, at 354 (“When a supervening event, like [a] fire,
makes performance impossible, contract law may excuse performance under the doctrine
of ‘impossibility of performance.’”).
14
See, e.g., Specialty Tires of Am., Inc. v. CIT Grp./Equip. Fin., Inc., 82 F.
Supp. 2d 434, 438 (W.D. Pa. 2000); Straus v. Kazemekas, 124 A. 234, 238 (Conn. 1924);
Ky. Lumber & Millwork Co. v. George H. Rommell Co., 78 S.W.2d 52, 54 (Ky. 1934);
Hous. Auth. of Bristol v. E. Tenn. Light & Power Co., 31 S.E.2d 273, 276 (Va. 1944).
15
CNA Int’l Reinsurance Co. v. Phoenix, 678 So. 2d 378, 380 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1996) (“[D]eath renders a personal services contract impossible to perform.”);
Comdisco Disaster Recovery Servs., Inc. v. Money Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 789 F. Supp. 48, 52
(D. Mass. 1992) (“[I]t is implied as a condition of the contract that the death of that
person . . . shall excuse performance.” (citation omitted)).
16
Newport News & Miss. Valley Co. v. McDonald Brick Co.’s Assignee, 59 S.W.
332, 334 (Ky. 1900) (“If subsequently to the making of contracts a statute is enacted
which makes the performance of the contract unlawful, a legal impossibility supervenes,
which releases the promisor from his obligation . . . .” (citation omitted)).
17
Chase Manhattan Bank v. Traffic Stream (BVI) Infrastructure Ltd., 86 F.
Supp. 2d 244, 255 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (“Impossibility excuses a party’s performance only when
the destruction of the subject matter of the contract or the means of performance makes
performance objectively impossible.”); Downs v. Rosenthal Collins Grp., L.L.C., 2011 IL App
(1st) 1090970, ¶ 39 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011) (“Impossibility of performance is a contractual
doctrine excusing performance where performance is rendered objectively impossible due to
destruction of the subject matter of the contract . . . .” (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted)); Krause v. Bd. of Trs. of Sch. Town of Crothersville, 70 N.E. 264, 266 (Ind. 1904)
(“As to a general covenant, it is the law that the destruction of the subject-matter of the
contract, thereby creating a physical or natural impossibility inherent in the nature of the
thing to be performed . . . will discharge the covenant . . . .”).
18
Opera Co. of Bos. v. Wolf Trap Found. for Performing Arts, 817 F.2d 1094, 1098
(4th Cir. 1987) (noting that under the impossibility doctrine, the promisor “will be excused,
unless he . . . expressly agreed in the contract to assume the risk of performance, whether
possible or not”); Jones v. Lujan, No. 90-4173, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 13687, at *5 (10th Cir.
June 25, 1991) (“[A] party to a contract that is impossible to fully perform may nonetheless
be held to that contract if he agreed to assume the risk of the impossibility.”).
19
Hellenic Lines, Ltd. v. United States, 512 F.2d 1196, 1211 (2d Cir. 1975)
(stating the impossibility doctrine applies “when the promisor is not ‘in contributing
fault’” (quoting RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 457 (AM. LAW INST. 1932)));
Partridge v. Presley, 189 F.2d 645, 648 (D.C. Cir. 1951) (noting under the impossibility
doctrine, the “promisor will be excused unless . . . the impossibility was due to his fault”).
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promisor neither knew nor had reason to know, at the time
the contract was made, of the circumstances that prevented
compliance with the contract.
20
Notably, the impossibility doctrine, which is the focus of
this article, should be distinguished from two other related
fundamental contract law doctrines that may excuse a party
from its promise: frustration of purpose and commercial
impracticability.
21
The frustration of purpose rule differs from
the impossibility doctrine in that the supervening event, the
one that triggers the rule, does not prevent fulfilment of the
agreement, but destroys the expected value of performance.
22
In
the case of commercial impracticability, performance is literally
possible, as opposed to a case triggering the impossibility
doctrine; however, obeying the agreement becomes too costly.
23
20
Roy v. Stephen Pontiac-Cadillac, Inc., 543 A.2d 775, 778 (Conn. App. Ct.
1988) (“One additional requirement, however, applies when a party claims a contract is
void due to existing impossibility: [T]he party seeking to use the doctrine must show that
he did not know or have reason to know the facts that made performance impossible.”
(alteration in original) (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted)); Franconia Two, LP v. Omniguru Sys., Inc., 82 Va. Cir. 256, 259 (2011) (“The
impossibility doctrine is subject to several important limitations. . . . [A] promisor who
seeks to use impossibility as an excuse for nonperformance . . . must neither know nor
have reason to know of the relevant government action.”).
21
See Peoplesoft U.S.A., Inc. v. Softeck, Inc., 227 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1119
(N.D. Cal. 2002) (noting that the impossibility and frustration of purpose doctrines “are
somewhat similar to each other”); Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. Kansas City S. Ry.,
45 F. Supp. 2d 847, 852 (D. Kan. 1999) (“Over time, the terms ‘impossibility’ and
‘impracticability’ have become somewhat interchangeable.”); P.J.M. Declercq, Modern
Analysis of the Legal Effect of Force Majeure Clauses in Situations of Commercial
Impracticability, 15 J.L. & COM. 213, 215 (1995) (“In the field of excuse for
nonperformance, three different concepts are implicated: physical impossibility,
frustration of purpose and commercial impracticability.”).
22
Lloyd v. Murphy, 153 P.2d 47, 50 (Cal. 1944) (“Although the doctrine of
frustration is akin to the doctrine of impossibility of performance . . . frustration is not
a form of impossibility . . . . Performance remains possible but the expected value of
performance to the party seeking to be excused has been destroyed by a fortuitous
event . . . .”); Kubinec v. Top Cab Dispatch, Inc., No. SUCV201203082BLS1, 2014 WL
3817016, at *7 (Mass. Super. Ct. June 25, 2014) (“The difference [between the doctrines
of impossibility and frustration of purpose] . . . lies in the effect of the supervening
event. Under frustration of purpose, ‘[p]erformance remains possible but the expected
value of performance to the party seeking to be excused has been destroyed by [the]
fortuitous event.’” (second and third alterations in original) (quoting Chase Precast
Corp. v. John J. Paonessa Co., 566 N.E.2d 603, 606 (Mass. 1991))); Perry v. Champlain
Oil Co., 134 A.2d 65, 66 (N.H. 1957) (stating the frustration of purpose is different from
the impossibility doctrine “in that it assumes the possibility of literal performance but
excuses performance because supervening events have essentially destroyed the
purpose for which the contract was made”).
23
See Declercq, supra note 21, at 216 (“In a case of commercial impracticability,
performance is still possible and the purpose of the contract can still be fulfilled.
However, due to a change in circumstances, the performance of the promisor’s obligations
has become economically senseless.”).
398 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:2
B. The Economic Analysis of the Impossibility Doctrine
The traditional economic analysis suggests that if
performance becomes impossible, courts should allocate the risk
of non-compliance to the party who is better able to bear that
risk.
24
In order to identify that party, the economic approach
suggests examining three main questions:
25
First, who among
the parties was in a better position, when the contract was
made, to estimate the probability that the event preventing
contract compliance would occur? Second, who was better able to
estimate the magnitude of the loss that materialized due to the
supervening event? And third, who was in a better position to
insure at least cost the risk that the supervening event would
occur, either by purchasing an insurance policy or by self-
insuring the risk? Self-insurance by a company can take several
alternative forms, including diversification of a risk across
different business activities
26
or charging a higher price from
customers to offset any losses caused by the risk.
27
To illustrate, the conventional economic analysis suggests
that in a typical employment contract, the employer is usually the
optimal bearer of the risk of the loss it suffers by the unexpected
death of an employee.
28
First, the employer is usually better able
than the employee to estimate the magnitude of loss caused to it
by the death of said employee.
29
The employer is also able to self-
insure against such event relatively cheaply,
30
for example, by
contracting with many other employees and thereby diversifying
the risk of an employee’s death. In addition, estimating the
24
See sources cited supra note 3.
25
Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 3, at 117 (“To determine which party is the
superior risk bearer three factors are relevant—knowledge of the magnitude of the loss,
knowledge of the probability that it will occur, and (other) costs of self- or market-insurance.”).
26
See id. at 111 (“[T]he performer can often self-insure at low cost simply by
diversifying the risk across the full range of his contractual obligations.”); id. at 95 (“[The
owners of a company can self-insure against risks] by holding a diversified portfolio of
common stocks . . . .”); see also Eric D. Beal, Posner and Moral Hazard, 7 CONN. INS. L.J.
81, 88 (2000) (noting that the party who can self-insure a risk is “the party who could
better spread the risk of loss”).
27
See Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 3, at 93 (“[A company] may be able to
eliminate the risk of . . . [relevant] contingencies simply by charging a higher price—in
effect, an insurance premium—to all of its customers; [The company] may in short be able
to self-insure.”); id. at 101 (“[A Company] could have spread the risk of . . . [contractual]
contingencies among all of [its] customers in [its] price . . . , thereby providing effective
and inexpensive self-insurance.”); see also Michael I. Meyerson, The Efficient Consumer
Form Contract: Law and Economics Meets the Real World, 24 GA. L. REV. 583, 618–19
(1990) (“[A business] can then eliminate many risks through self-insurance, simply by
charging all customers a higher price.”).
28
Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 3, at 100.
29
Id. (“[T]he employer is better able to estimate the cost to him . . . if the
employee dies . . . .”).
30
Id. (noting the employer “can usually self-insure against” the employee’s death).
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probability of the employee’s death is generally no more difficult
for the employer than for the employee.
31
As a result, the
economic analysis suggests that if the employer were to seek
damages, alleging that the employee’s death breached the
employment contract, the employee’s estate should be discharged
from contractual liability.
32
C. A Distinction Between the Impossibility Doctrine and the
Economic Analysis
The analysis under the legal impossibility rule differs
from the traditional economic analysis of the rule. When the
conditions of the legal rule are met, an excuse from
performance is given to the promisor categorically, that is,
without examining whether or not it is the best risk bearer
among the parties.
33
On the other hand, under the economic
model, an excuse is not categorically given to the promisor,
even if the conditions of the legal doctrine are met.
34
According
to this model, the loss of non-performance is assigned to the
better risk bearer, either the promisee or the promisor.
35
Consequently, if the promisor is the optimal risk bearer, it will
not be discharged from its obligations, even if it has a valid
claim under the legal doctrine.
36
To illustrate, assume that an
owner of a music hall is unable to fulfill their contractual
obligation to rent the hall to a musician since unexpected
lighting ignited a fire that destroyed the hall.
37
Under the
economic model, the owner of the music hall (the promisor) will
not be excused from their contractual obligation to rent the hall
to a musician (the promisee) if the owner bears the risk of fire
at a lesser cost than the musician, for example, by easily
purchasing fire insurance that covers liability for contract
31
Id. (“Estimating life expectancy is in general no more (if no less) difficult
for the employer than for the employee.”).
32
Id. (“If the employer were seeking damages as a result of the employee’s
death, alleging that death had caused a breach of the employee’s obligations under the
contract, the contract should also be discharged.”). Presumably, the employee-promisor
would also be excused under the doctrine of impossibility in this scenario.
33
See supra Section I.A.
34
For the legal conditions of the impossibility doctrine, see supra Section I.A.
35
See supra Section I.B.
36
Donald J. Smythe, Impossibility and Impracticability, in 6 ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF LAW AND ECONOMICS: CONTRACT LAW AND ECONOMICS 207, 209 (Gerrit De Gees ed.,
2d ed. 2011) (According to the traditional economic analysis, “the party should not be
excused if it is the superior risk bearer”); Cenini et al., supra note 3, at 35 (“[I]f it is the
promisor who is the superior risk bearer, their performance failure will be considered
as a normal breach of contract and will require expectation damages to be paid.”).
37
See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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breach.
38
In such case, the owner’s failure to fulfill their
contractual obligation constitutes a breach of contract for
which they are liable in damages to the musician.
39
Conversely,
under the legal doctrine, the owner is excused from performing
the contract since the fire rendered performance impossible.
40
In addition, the owner is not only freed from performing their
specific contractual obligation but also from the duty to pay
breach of contract damages to the musician.
41
Remarkably, the results of the economic model may differ
from the results of the legal doctrine quite frequently, and not
only in isolated cases. According to the economic model, the
promisor is normally the best risk bearer.
42
This is because it is,
inter alia, frequently better able to estimate the probability that
an event preventing it from fulfilling its obligations would occur,
and therefore may also be able to insure the loss from said event
at a lower cost.
43
As the promisor is normally the superior risk
bearer, the outcome of the economic model may often be that the
promisor will not be discharged from complying with the
contract.
44
The results under the legal doctrine, however, may
often be opposite. The doctrine, by its nature, excuses the
promisor from performing the contract when compliance becomes
impossible.
45
By doing so, the doctrine usually assigns the risk of
non-performance to the promisee and not to the promisor.
46
38
See COOTER, JR. & ULEN, supra note 3, at 351.
39
See, e.g., Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 3, at 83 (“Ordinarily the failure
of one party to a contract to fulfill the performance required of him constitutes a breach
of contract for which he is liable in damages to the other party.”).
40
See HILLMAN, supra note 1, at 354–55.
41
See, e.g., Brener, supra note 3, at 466 (“If the promisor is excused from
performance by reason of impossibility, he is not only freed from his specific contractual
obligation, but also from his obligation to pay any typical breach damages to the promisee.”).
42
Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 3, at 110 (“The performing party to a
contract is generally the superior risk bearer.”).
43
Id. at 110–11 (“The performing party to a contract is generally the superior
risk bearer. Typically, though not invariably, he is better able . . . to estimate the
probability of its occurrence . . . . [T]he performer can often self-insure at low cost simply
by diversifying the risk across the full range of his contractual obligations.”). In addition,
the promisor is assumed to be at least as able as the promisee to estimate the magnitude
of loss if a supervening event occurs. Id. at 111 (“Often, too, [the promisor] is at least as
able as the payor to estimate the magnitude of the loss if the event occurs.”).
44
See id. at 110–11 (“In many individual . . . cases economic analysis . . . will
fail to yield a definite answer . . . as to which party is the superior risk bearer. . . . But
as long as the performer is generally the superior risk bearer, assigning the risk to him
in cases of doubt—that is, refusing discharge in those cases—can be expected to yield
correct results more often than the contrary rule.”); see also Cenini et al., supra note 3,
at 35–36 (noting the results of the superior risk bearer “in most cases” would be the
same as the results “that would have been achieved under the pacta sunt servanda
principle,” namely that the promisor is always liable for his breach).
45
See Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 3, at 90; see also supra Section I.A.
46
Paul L. Joskow, Commercial Impossibility, the Uranium Market and the
Westinghouse Case, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 119, 153 (1977) (“[A] . . . rule of discharge
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II. THE EMPIRICAL TEST
The efficiency of the superior risk bearer model has been
a source of intense theoretical debate and controversy among
legal scholars.
47
Opponents of the model present several major
theoretical arguments against its application by courts.
48
First,
the model is impossible to apply in practice since courts often do
not have all the relevant economic information needed to
identify who is the superior risk bearer.
49
Second, courts may
often be unable to determine which of the parties is the optimal
bearer of risk since both parties may be able to bear the risk at a
similar cost.
50
Third, judges may find it difficult to identify the
optimal risk bearer
51
given that they often lack the necessary
inherent in the impossibility doctrine shifts the burden of some of these risks to the
promisee.”); Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 3, at 90 (“[I]nvoking impossibility or some
related notion, the law could treat the failure to perform as excusable and discharge
the contract, thereby in effect assigning the risk to the promisee.”); see also Wagner,
supra note 2, at 65 (“By excusing the promisor’s non-performance in specific situations,
the impossibility defense assigns some risk of loss to the promisee.”). For the historical
progress of the impossibility doctrine, see generally William Herbert Page, The
Development of the Doctrine of Impossibility of Performance, 18 MICH. L. REV. 589
(1920); David E. Rosengren & Jared Cohane, The Impossibility Doctrine—Still Hazy
After All These Years: Part I, 2 AM. COLL. CONSTRUCTION LAW. J. 63 (2008).
47
See, e.g., Jennifer Camero, Mission Impracticable: The Impossibility of
Commercial Impracticability, 13 U.N.H. L. REV. 1, 22–23 (2014); Melvin A.
Eisenberg, Impossibility, Impracticability, and Frustration, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 207,
253 (2009); Sheldon W. Halpern, Application of the Doctrine of Commercial
Impracticability: Searching for “The Wisdom of Solomon,” 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1123,
1160–61 (1987); Alan O. Sykes, The Doctrine of Commercial Impracticability in a
Second-Best World, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 43, 93 (1990); George G. Triantis, Contractual
Allocations of Unknown Risks: A Critique of the Doctrine of Commercial
Impracticability, 42 U. TORONTO L.J. 450, 476 (1992).
48
See sources cited supra note 47.
49
MELVIN A. EISENBERG, FOUNDATIONAL PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT LAW 657
(2018) (“Posner and Rosenfield’s [superior risk bearer] test would be virtually impossible
to apply in practice.”); Daniel T. Ostas & Frank P. Darr, Understanding Commercial
Impracticability: Tempering Efficiency with Community Fairness Norms, 27 RUTGERS
L.J. 343, 352 (1996) (“Although the efficient insurer hypothesis may make some sense in
terms of abstract logic, it becomes problematic in its pragmatic application. . . . The court
typically does not have enough information.”); Bruce, supra note 12, at 321 (“In many
cases, however, the court will be unable to determine which of the parties is the superior
risk bearer . . . because the court lacks sufficient information.”); Sykes, supra note 47, at
93 (“But it is exceptionally difficult to formulate a default rule of contract law that limits
discharge to the circumstances in which it is efficient—to administer such a rule, the
courts will typically require more information than is reasonably available to them.”).
50
Bruce, supra note 12, at 321; Camero, supra note 47, at 22–23 (“[T]he
application of the superior risk bearer test is unworkable. Information and insurance
costs are often similar for both parties, making the determination of the cheaper insurer
irresolvable . . . .”); see also Eisenberg, supra note 47, at 253 (noting that both contract
parties have a similar capacity to self-insure a relevant risk by charging premium for
taking the risk or by hedging the risk); POSNER, CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY, supra note
1, at 162 (“Unfortunately, it will rarely be obvious who is the cheaper insurer. Both
parties could buy insurance against asteroid strikes for—one suspects—the same price.”).
51
Triantis, supra note 47, at 476 (stating that the application of the superior risk
bearer model suffers inter alia the following obstacle: “the competence of the court to
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economic expertise to make such identification. Fourth, the
economic model is exposed to a hindsight bias
52
since the court is
examining in retrospect who was, when the contract was formed,
the superior risk bearer.
53
While the theoretical debate over the desirability of the
economic model is vibrant, there are no systematic empirical
studies aimed at directly exposing the actual opinion of real-
world contract parties about the model. The purpose of this Part
of the article is to empirically examine whether sophisticated
parties to commercial contracts adopt the economic model in
their contracts. For that purpose, this Part will analyze the
frequency and content of contractual clauses that allocate
between the parties the risks of non-performance due to
uncontrollable circumstances. These clauses are often labeled as
force majeure clauses and will be presented in the next section.
A. Force Majeure Clause: A Brief Overview
A force majeure clause is a contractual provision that
assigns between the parties the risk that unavoidable events
will prevent compliance with the agreement.
54
These events may
include acts of God, such as hurricanes, tornadoes, or
earthquakes.
55
These events may also include human-generated
events that prevent contract performance, such as strikes,
identify the superior risk bearer”); Halpern, supra note 47, at 1160–61 (“One must question
whether the parties themselves, let alone the courts, are equipped to make an analysis of
the efficiency-relevant circumstances as they existed at the inception of the transaction.”).
52
A hindsight bias is the “tendency of decisionmakers to attach an excessively
high probability to an event simply because it ended up occurring.” Christine Jolls et al.,
A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1523 (1998).
53
Camero, supra note 47, at 23 (“[T]he superior risk bearer test suffers from
hindsight bias . . . because the court is examining who could have insured or minimized the
risk more efficiently in hindsight and with greater information than the parties had at the
moment of contract formation.”); Halpern, supra note 47, at 1160–61 (“Efficient rule-making
[under the superior risk bearer model] at contracting time thus requires an ex ante
determination of the relevant factors and the appropriate and optimal balance. When a
dispute arises, however, judgments are made ex post.” (footnote omitted)).
54
Corestar Int’l PTE. Ltd. v. LPB Commc’ns., Inc., 513 F. Supp. 2d 107, 120 n.8
(D.N.J. 2007) (“A force majeure clause is, ‘[a] contractual provision allocating the risk if
performance becomes impossible or impracticable, [especially] as a result of an event or
effect that the parties could not have anticipated or controlled.’” (emphasis omitted) (quoting
Force Majeure Clause, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004))); Dyco Petroleum Corp. v.
ANR Pipeline Co., No. 86-C-1097-C, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18317, at *10 (N.D. Okla. Sept.
1, 1988) (“A force majeure clause is a provision in a contract excusing performance by a
party under specified circumstances. A force majeure clause defines the areas of
unforeseeable events that might excuse nonperformance within the contract period.”
(citations omitted)); see also Pillsbury Co. v. Wells Dairy, Inc., 752 N.W.2d 430, 440 (Iowa
2008); OWBR LLC v. Clear Channel Commc’ns., Inc., 266 F. Supp. 2d 1214, 1222 (D. Haw.
2003); Moore v. Jet Stream Invs., Ltd., 261 S.W.3d 412, 419–20 (Tex. App. 2008).
55
David Gurnick & Tal Grinblat, Be Prepared—Managing Catastrophic
Risks in Franchise Systems, 21 FRANCHISE L.J. 128, 132 (2002).
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terrorism, or wars.
56
To illustrate, a force majeure clause may
state:
Either Party shall be excused from any delay or failure in
performance required hereunder if caused by reason of any
occurrence or contingency beyond its reasonable control, including,
but not limited to, acts of God, acts of war, fire, insurrection, strikes,
lock-outs or other serious labor disputes, riots, earthquakes, floods,
explosions, or other acts of nature.
57
Force majeure clauses are normally enforced by courts.
58
Hence, if the parties want to contractually adopt the economic
model of the impossibility doctrine, they can design a force majeure
clause that directs parties or courts to assign uncontrollable force
majeure risks to the better risk bearer. Such an assignment, which
adopts the economic model, could take two main forms. First, the
parties could easily draft a simple force majeure clause that
includes a general statement whereby the risk of non-performance
due to force majeure is assigned to the party who is the superior
bearer of said risk. Such a clause will guide the parties or courts to
identify the superior risk bearer after an uncontrollable event has
rendered performance impossible. Alternatively, the parties could
specify ex ante, in the contract, the name of the party who will
assume the risk of non-performance of each specific obligation and
for each specific type of uncontrollable event. Such specific
assignment would be based on identifying the superior risk bearer
for each obligation and event during contract negotiations.
By assigning uncontrollable risks in one of these two
forms, both of which implement the economic model, the parties
would essentially contract around the legal impossibility
doctrine,
59
which lacks the economic calculus.
60
Such contracting
around is legally achievable since the impossibility doctrine is





Immune Therapeutics, Inc., Exclusive Agency Agreement (Form 8-K), at
Ex. 10.1 art. 11 (Nov. 15, 2016), 2016 WL 06681833.
58
See, e.g., Princeton Homes, Inc. v. Virone, 612 F.3d 1324, 1332 (11th Cir. 2010)
(“[F]orce majeure clauses broader than the scope of impossibility are enforceable.” (emphasis
omitted)); Sherwin Alumina L.P. v. AluChem, Inc., 512 F. Supp. 2d 957, 966 (S.D. Tex. 2007)
(“Forcemajeure clauses in contracts are enforceable under Texas law.” (citations omitted)).
59
SeeWis. Elec. Power Co. v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 557 F.3d 504, 507 (7th Cir. 2009)
(“Modern contracting parties often do contract around the [impossibility] doctrine . . . . The
clauses in which they do this are called forcemajeure (‘superior force’) clauses.”).
60
See supra Section I.A.
61
Wis. Elec. Power Co., 557 F.3d at 506 (“Parties can, however, contract around
the [impossibility] doctrine, because it is just a gap filler . . . .”); Commonwealth Edison v.
Allied-General Nuclear Servs., 731 F. Supp. 850, 855 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (“[T]he doctrine of
impossibility is an ‘off-the-rack’ provision that governs only if the parties have not drafted
a specific assignment of the risk otherwise assigned by the provision.”).
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Accordingly, the frequency with which sophisticated
parties to commercial contracts opt out of the impossibility rule
and adopt the alternative economic model via a force majeure
clause can indicate how beneficial this model is for the parties.
If most of the agreements contract around the default rule and
embrace the model via a force majeure clause, then the model
may indeed be beneficial for both parties. Otherwise, the
efficiency of the economic model for the parties may be dubious.
In addition, a contractual adoption of a force majeure
clause that reflects the economic model may indicate that the
parties believe that the legal outcome of the model is clearer
than that of the traditional impossibility rule, thereby increasing
the probability of a settlement in case of force majeure.
62
Conversely, if the parties prefer to stick to the default
impossibility rule, it may indicate that they do not perceive the
economic model as a clearer solution that increases the
probability of a settlement.
B. The Theoretical Hypothesis
While the traditional economic analysis suggests that
the superior risk bearer model is beneficial for both parties,
63
the hypothesis of this article is different. This study predicts
that parties to a commercial contract are unlikely to adopt the
economic model within their contract since the model has two
significant shortcomings.
To begin with, the application of the model might be
prohibitively costly.
64
This is because the three basic questions
for identifying the superior risk bearer—namely, who is better
able to predict the probability of the relevant risk, estimate the




For the general economic argument that settlement rates are higher when
the law is certain, see, for example, Richard E. Levy & Robert L. Glicksman, Agency-
Specific Precedents, 89 TEX. L. REV. 499, 574 (2011) (“[L]egal uncertainty . . . makes
settlement more difficult because parties may entertain substantially different
assessments of the likely outcome of litigation.”); Larry E. Ribstein, From Efficiency to
Politics in Contractual Choice of Law, 37 GA. L. REV. 363, 403 (2003) (“[G]reater certainty
about their rights gives parties more incentive to settle.”).
63
See supra notes 6–7 and accompanying text.
64
See Camero, supra note 47, at 23 (“[A]scertaining which party was able to
minimize the risk or insure against it creates an administrative nightmare. Given the
nature of the information necessary to determine the superior risk bearer, determining
and collecting the relevant information is difficult, [and] time-consuming . . . .” (footnotes
omitted)); Sykes, supra note 47, at 93 (“But it is exceptionally difficult to formulate a
default rule of contract law that limits discharge to the circumstances in which it is
efficient—to administer such a rule, the courts will typically require more information
than is reasonably available to them.”).
65
Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 3, at 117.
2020] THE IMPOSSIBILITY DOCTRINE 405
include too many complex sub-questions that need to be
examined.
66
To illustrate, the following major non-exclusive
questions could be examined under the economic model, and
their answers may often be time-consuming to reach, and
difficult to quantify:
1. Which contract party has superior professional
skill vis-à-vis the risk that rendered performance impossible?
67
The existence of professional expertise can serve as an indication
that a party can more effectively estimate the likelihood of a risk
within its professional domain. For example, a company that
specializes in drilling would be better able than its client, a non-
drilling company, to estimate the probability of encountering
rocks deep below the surface of the earth that render a drilling
contract impossible.
68
2. Which party has superior previous experience vis-
à-vis the relevant risk? A mature company’s superior experience
can serve as an indication that that company can more easily
estimate the probability of a potential risk than a newer
company, lacking previous risk-related experience.
69
Such
previous experience may also indicate that the more established
company can identify more easily mechanisms to self-insure
against a potential risk based on its previous experience.
70
66
Andrew Kull,Mistake, Frustration, and the Windfall Principle of Contractual
Remedies, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 47 (1991) (“[T]he determination of superior risk-bearing
capacity depends on so many additional variables, many of them difficult to establish
conclusively, that it will normally be impossible for contracting parties to predict with
confidence how a future court might decide the issue.”); Halpern, supra note 47, at 1165
(“Where we face the problem of allocating risks [under the superior risk bearer
model] . . . , too many factors are present to allow us to point to one, and only one, optimal
analytic framework.”); Ostas & Darr, supra note 49, at 352 (“Although the efficient
insurer hypothesis may make some sense in terms of abstract logic, it becomes
problematic in its pragmatic application. In most cases, it is extremely difficult to infer
which of the two parties was the more efficient insurer. . . . [T]he factors that determine
efficiency in insurance seem quite complex and idiosyncratic.”).
67
Cf. Richard C. Chen, A Contractual Approach to Investor-State Regulatory
Disputes, 40 YALE J. INT’L L. 295, 332 (2015) (“[W]ith regard to risk appraisal, the
investor would be better positioned to evaluate risks that relate more closely to its
specific business.”).
68
Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 3, at 101 (“[A] driller, was better able than his
customer to estimate the probability of encountering rock deep below the surface of the
earth . . . .”); see also RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 113 (9th ed. 2014)
[hereinafter POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW] (asserting a contractor’s professional
knowledge about the fire hazards of buildings under construction serves as indication that
they are a more superior bearer than their client of a risk that a fire, caused through no
fault of the contractor, will render the performance of the contract impossible).
69
See Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 3, at 108 (“[T]he ability to estimate
the probability of the drought—suggests placing the risk on the rancher (depending,
however, on the particular cattle owner’s prior experience in the region) . . . .”).
70
See id. at 93 (“Depending on . . . [a party’s] prior experience with contingencies
such as occurred in the contract . . . , [he] may be able to eliminate the risk of such
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3. Which party had superior physical control over
the subject matter of the contract that was affected by a relevant
risk?
71
Such superior control can indicate who was better able to
estimate the probability that the object would be affected by the
risk. To illustrate, assume that during the performance of an
independent contractor agreement to build a skyscraper, a fire
destroyed a significant part of the building, through no fault of
the independent contractor.
72
The fact that the independent
contractor, as opposed to their client, had physical control over
the skyscraper while building it can indicate that the contractor
was better able than the client to estimate the probability that a
fire would render performance impossible.
73
4. Which party can diversify its portfolio of ownership
over different firms more effectively? Such capacity to diversify
can indicate who is the better self-insurer of the relevant risk. For
example, the owners of a public firm facing a relevant risk can
often self-insure the risk by holding a diversified portfolio of
securities in many other firms whose earnings would not be
affected by said risk.
74
In contrast, it is often more difficult for the
owners of a closely held corporation to diversify their risks
because their holdings in the corporation frequently reflect a
significant fraction of their assets.
75
5. Which party, among the two, can enter into
additional contracts with other parties who are unlikely to be
affected by the relevant risk? Such contracting ability can
indicate who is the better self-insurer of the relevant risk. To
contingencies simply by charging a higher price—in effect, an insurance premium—to all of
its customers; [he] may in short be able to self-insure.”).
71
See Eyal Zamir, Toward a General Concept of Conformity in the Performance of
Contracts, 52 LA. L. REV. 1, 87 (1991) (“The factors that tend to make the promisor a
‘superior risk bearer’ [include] . . . her control of the object prior to its delivery . . . .”).
72
This example is based on, POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra
note 68, at 113; see also POSNER, CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY, supra note 1, at 162.
73
See POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 68, at 113 (“[T]he
contractor generally is better placed for fire protection than the owner because he controls
the premises . . . .”); see also POSNER, CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY, supra note 1, at 162
(“Insurers would rather deal with the party in control of the structure than the party that
does not control the structure.”).
74
Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 3, at 92 (“[A] corporation’s shareholders
might eliminate the risk associated with some contract the corporation had made by
holding a portfolio of securities in which their shares in the corporation were combined
with shares in many other corporations whose earnings would not be (adversely)
affected if this particular corporation were to default on the contract. This would be an
example of self-insurance.”); COOTER, JR. & ULEN, supra note 3, at 351 (“[T]he
investors in a factory subject to an earthquake hazard can spread risk by purchasing
stocks from companies in different locations (‘portfolio diversification’).”).
75
Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 3, at 93–94 (“It is generally more difficult
for the owners of a closely held corporation to diversify away the risks associated with
their holdings in the corporation, for often those holdings represent a large fraction of
their net assets.”).
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illustrate, assume that the performance of a transportation
contract between a mining company and a trucker was rendered
impossible when the mining company’s store was destroyed
unexpectedly.
76
The potential fact that the trucker could easily
enter into transportation contracts with other customers who
were unlikely to be affected by the store’s destruction could serve
as an indication that the trucker is a superior self-insurer of the
loss caused by non-performance.
77
6. Which party holds a market position that allows
it to charge higher prices from its customers more easily?
78
This
charging capability indicates who is better able to insure the
relevant risk since high prices serve as an insurance premium,
thereby allowing a party to self-insure against a contract risk.
79
7. Which party can more easily purchase single
market insurance that aggregates many risks, including the
one that materialized by a supervening event? Such purchasing
capability can indicate who is the better insurer of the risk. For
example, assume that a shipping company signs a
transportation contract with a shipper and that an unexpected
war, which forces the transportation route to close, prevents
the shipping company from performing the contract.
80
In such
case, the potential fact that the shipping company, as opposed
to the shipper, can purchase single market insurance that
covers non-performance of multiple voyages would serve as an
indication that the shipping company is the superior insurer
among the contract parties.
81
8. Which company, among the contract parties, is
larger? The fact that one party is bigger than the other is an
indication that it can bear a contractual risk more effectively.
82
76
For a similar example, see id. at 105.
77
See id. (“[The trucker] could spread the risk by contracting to supply hauling
services to customers who were engaged in other businesses and hence were unlikely to
be affected by the [mine] closing.”); see also POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra
note 68, at 112 (“[A driller] should also be able to self-insure at low cost [against
unexpectedly difficult soil conditions] if he does a lot of drilling in different areas and if
the risks of encountering unexpectedly difficult conditions are independent.”).
78
For example, a party who faces less competition may charge higher prices.
Cf. Yongmin Chen & Michael H. Riordan, Price-Increasing Competition, 39 RAND J.
ECON. 1042, 1044 (2008) (“[L]ess competition necessarily results in higher prices.”).
79
Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 3, at 93 (“[A party] may be able to eliminate
the risk of such contingencies simply by charging a higher price—in effect, an insurance
premium—to all of its customers; [That party] may in short be able to self-insure.”).
80
For a similar example, see id. at 103–04.
81
Id. at 104 (noting that a shipping company would be the superior risk bearer
since, among other reasons, it “could, if it desired, purchase in a single transaction
market insurance covering multiple voyages.”).
82
Mark S. Beasley et al., Enterprise Risk Management: An Empirical Analysis
of Factors Associated with the Extent of Implementation, 24 J. ACCT. & PUB. POL’Y 521,
529 (2005) (“Enterprises that are larger . . . are more likely to be further into [enterprise
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This is because large firms, as opposed to small firms, benefit
from economies of scale when implementing risk management
plans.
83
The fact that too many complex questions and sub-
questions need to be examined under the traditional economic
model is not the only reason this article hypothesizes that
parties to commercial contracts are unlikely to adopt this
model. Not only is examining all these questions too costly, but
doing so yields uncertain results.
84
This uncertainty persists
because the answers to the numerous questions for identifying
the superior bearer may often point in opposite directions.
85
For
example, a party that has superior experience—directly related
to a relevant risk—may appear to be better situated to
estimate the likelihood of the risk and its magnitude of loss.
The other party—being a large public firm with many
alternative customers—may appear to be better able to self-
risk management] implementation than smaller firms . . . .”); L. Lee Colquitt et al.,
Integrated Risk Management and the Role of the Risk Manager, 2 RISKMGMT. & INS. REV.
43, 54 (1999) (“Also apparent from the results of the survey is the tendency for the level of
risk management integration to be affected by the size of the firm . . . .”); Nadine Gatzert
& Michael Martin, Determinants and Value of Enterprise Risk Management: Empirical
Evidence from the Literature, 18 RISK MGMT. & INS. REV. 29, 36 (2015) (“A positive
correlation of company size with the extent of the risk management system has also been
shown previously.” (citation omitted)); Nargess Mottaghi Golshan & Siti Zaleha Abdul
Rasid, Determinants of Enterprise Risk Management Adoption: An Empirical Analysis of
Malaysian Public Listed Firms, 6 WORLD ACAD. SCI., ENGINEERING & TECH. 242, 243
(2012) (“[L]arger firms are more likely to implement integrated risk management
concepts than smaller firms.”); Donald Pagach & Richard Warr, The Characteristics of
Firms That Hire Chief Risk, 78 J. RISK & INS. 185, 206 (2011) (“[W]e find that firms
appear to implement [enterprise risk management] when they are larger . . . .”).
83
See sources cited supra note 82
84
Daniel T. Ostas, Postmodern Economic Analysis of Law: Extending the
Pragmatic Visions of Richard A. Posner, 36 AM. BUS. L.J. 193, 234–35 (1998) (“In many, if
not most, cases it is very difficult to determine which of the two parties could more
efficiently take insurance. . . . Hence, traditional [Economic Analysis of Law] appears to
have identified a factor in excuse cases, but that factor is not sufficiently robust to guide
the courts.”); John Elofson, Note, The Dilemma of Changed Circumstances in Contract
Law: An Economic Analysis of the Foreseeability and Superior Risk Bearer Tests, 30
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 1,13 (1996) (“An equally fundamental problem with superior
risk bearer tests is that they generally fail to produce predictable results.”);
Triantis, supra note 47, at 476 (noting the identification of the superior risk bearer is
unpredictable and not obvious); Wagner, supra note 2, at 88–89 (“The serious objection to
[the superior risk bearer model], however, is its indecisiveness. . . . [I]t seems
questionable whether it is possible to identify one of the parties as the ‘better insurer’ of
the risk of non-performance.”).
85
Michael J. Trebilcock, The Role of Insurance Considerations in the Choice of
Efficient Civil Liability Rules, 4 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243, 253 (1988) (“Posner and Rosenfield
acknowledge that often (I would be inclined to argue, typically) the criteria they propose for
identifying the most efficient insurer will point in opposite directions . . . .”); Triantis, supra
note 47, at 476 (the economic criteria for identifying the superior bearer “often point in
opposing directions.”); Camero, supra note 47, at 22–23 (“Other relevant factors such as the
party best able to estimate the probability of the supervening event and the best party able
to estimate the event’s resulting loss often result in conflicting conclusions as to which party
is the superior risk bearer.”).
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insure the same risk.
86
Similarly, a party that has superior
physical control over the subject matter of the contract that
was affected by a relevant risk may be perceived, at first
analysis, to be better positioned to evaluate the chances that
the object would be affected by the risk.
87
However, the other
party may have superior professional skill related to the risk,
indicating that it may be better positioned to evaluate the
risk.
88
In sum, since the application of the superior risk bearer
model is costly, and the results of the model are uncertain, this




The sample of this empirical study is based on 1,926
commercial contracts governed by U.S. law and included as
exhibits to Form 8-K filings with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC).
90
Accordingly, the sample includes only
commercial contracts in which at least one of the parties is a
sophisticated company that is legally required to report to the
SEC. These are normally companies with more than $10
86
See Ostas, supra note 84, at 234 (“At times, one party may appear to be
better situated to estimate the likelihood and severity of potential losses while the other
party may appear to be better able to diversify the risks.”).
87
See supra notes 71–73 and accompanying text.
88
See supra notes 67–68 and accompanying text.
89
See also Kull, supra note 66, at 46–47 (“[N]o rational contracting party would
willingly adopt [the superior risk bearer model], given the near impossibility of predicting
which party would later be found by the court to have been the superior risk bearer with
respect to the risk in question.”).
90
For more details about Form 8-K, see infra notes 117–119 and
accompanying text. For the same methodological approach of analyzing contracts
contained as exhibits to Form 8-K filings with the SEC, see Theodore Eisenberg et al.,
Arbitration’s Summer Soldiers: An Empirical Study of Arbitration Clauses in
Consumer and Nonconsumer Contracts, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 871, 880 (2008);
Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Damages Versus Specific Performance:
Lessons from Commercial Contracts, 12 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 29, 43 (2015)
[hereinafter Eisenberg & Miller, Damages Versus Specific Performance]; Theodore
Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Do Juries Add Value? Evidence from an Empirical
Study of Jury Trial Waiver Clauses in Large Corporate Contracts, 4 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 539, 550 (2007) [hereinafter Eisenberg & Miller, Do Juries Add Value?];
Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The English Versus the American Rule on
Attorney Fees: An Empirical Study of Public Company Contracts, 98 CORNELL L. REV.
327, 349 (2013); Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, Ex Ante Choices of Law and
Forum: An Empirical Analysis of Corporate Merger Agreements, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1975,
1983 (2006); Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Flight from Arbitration: An
Empirical Study of Ex Ante Arbitration Clauses in the Contracts of Publicly Held
Companies, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 335, 348 (2007) [hereinafter Eisenberg & Miller,
The Flight from Arbitration]; Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Flight to
New York: An Empirical Study of Choice of Law and Choice of Forum Clauses in
Publicly-Held Companies’ Contracts, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1475, 1487 (2009).
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million in assets.
91
This sample covers a ten-year period from
January 1, 2009 to January 1, 2019. The contracts for this
period were located via Westlaw’s commercial law sample
agreement search engine.
92
The Westlaw sample agreements
database has contracts included in SEC filings during the
sample period.
93
The subject matter of commercial contracts examined in
this study is highly heterogeneous and includes the following:
distribution, agency, consulting, management services,
cooperation, independent contractor, marketing, licensing,
financing, and manufacturing agreements.
94
The major types of
contracts, as reflected in the contracts’ titles, are shown in
Table 1.
91
See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 12(g), 15 U.S.C. § 78l(g); see also
Fact Answers, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, https://www.sec.gov/about/laws.s
html#secexact1934 [https://perma.cc/5JF4-GXZ4].
92




Summer Associate Research Guide: Locate Model Forms and Sample
Documents for Drafting, LOY. U. CHI. SCH. L., http://lawlibguides.luc.edu/summer_
associate_research/forms [https://perma.cc/WZ5G-C35L] (“[In Westlaw] you will find more
than one million executed business agreements culled from the SEC’s EDGAR database.”).
94
A commercial contract, as opposed to a consumer or employment contract,
is typically an agreement between two or more business entities. See Alan Schwartz &
Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541,
543 (2003) (“Even a theory of contract law that focuses only on the enforcement of
bargains must still consider the entire continuum from standard form contracts
between firms and consumers to commercial contracts among businesses.”); Edward A.
Zelinsky, Deregulating Marriage: The Pro-Marriage Case for Abolishing Civil
Marriage, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1161, 1198 (2006) (“Consumer contracts differ
from commercial contracts between businesses.”); see also Joshua M. Silverstein, Using
the West Key Number System as a Data Collection and Coding Device for Empirical
Legal Scholarship: Demonstrating the Method Via a Study of Contract Interpretation,
34 J.L. & COM. 203, 261 (2016).
2020] THE IMPOSSIBILITY DOCTRINE 411
Table 1. Number and Percentage of Contracts by Type (sample
size n = 1,926)
A random examination of the industries of the companies
that filed these contracts with the SEC indicates that they are
also heterogeneous and include, for example, the following:
advertising, agriculture, banking, beverages, biological products,
business services, cosmetics, electricity, hotels and motels,
management services, medical instruments, metal mining,
patents, pharmaceuticals, real estate, restaurants, software,
television, transportation, and wholesale.
95
D. Methodology
In order to examine whether the sample contacts
embraced the superior risk bearer model in cases where
uncontrollable events cause failure in performance, the
following steps were taken: First, an in-depth review of the full
text of random commercial contracts in the sample was
conducted. The purpose of this review was to identify terms
commonly associated with clauses that allocate the risks of
non-performance due to uncontrollable events, commonly
labeled as force majeure clauses.
96
Second, based on this in-
95
The companies’ industries were located via the EDGAR company search
engine. See EDGAR: Company Filings, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, https://
www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/companysearch.html [https://perma.cc/8BH6-2FLD].
96
See supra Section II.A.





Distribution 234 12.15 Exporter Services 40 2.08
Consulting or
Advisory







Cooperation 111 5.76 Purchase 36 1.87
Marketing 81 4.21 Supply 27 1.40
Independent
Contractor
78 4.05 Storage 24 1.25
Financing 65 3.37 Research 14 0.73
Licensing 61 3.17 Advertising 6 0.31
Manufacturing 53 2.75 Assignment 6 0.31
Terminal Services 46 2.39 Pipeline Services 4 0.21
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depth review, an online search was conducted, using Westlaw’s
Terms and Connectors search engine, for contracts containing
terms that are associated with such risk-allocation clauses.
97
This search included the terms “force majeure” or “perform! /s
beyond /s control.”
98
Contracts that did not include these terms
were coded “0.” Contracts that included these terms were coded
“1.” In order to verify that the search results for terms
associated with a force majeure clause were related to the
allocation of uncontrollable risks, a manual examination of all
the contracts that were coded “1” was conducted. All the
contracts in which the content of the search terms was
unrelated to a clause intended to allocate uncontrollable risks
were coded “0.”
99
Finally, all the risk-allocation clauses in the
contracts that were coded “1” were thoroughly read and
analyzed in an effort to examine whether these clauses
incorporate the superior risk bearer model.
E. Results
Out of 1,926 contracts, 1,271 (66%) did not include a
force majeure clause that allocates uncontrollable risks. This
result indicates that most parties prefer not to contract around
the default allocation of risks provided under the impossibility
doctrine. By maintaining the governance of the default
doctrine, which lacks the economic calculus, the parties signal
their preference not to adopt the economic model. Otherwise,
the parties would have drafted a force majeure clause that
embraces the economic model.
In addition, even among the minority of contracts that
did include a force majeure clause, many contracts did not
seem to clearly embrace the superior risk bearer paradigm. Out
of 655 contracts that included a force majeure clause, 461
(70.4%) included a general one-size-fits-all statement that
excuses any of the parties from performing the contract in case
of force majeure. To illustrate, a typical clause stated broadly,
“Neither Party shall be liable for any delay in performing its
obligations under this Agreement, if such delay is caused by
97
For a similar methodological approach applied on a “specific performance”
clause, see Eisenberg &Miller,Damages Versus Specific Performance, supra note 90, at 44.
98
The “!” symbol was used to search for words with multiple endings, and the
“/s” symbol was used to search for terms used in the same sentence. See Search Tips,
WESTLAW, https://1.next.westlaw.com/Search/Home.html?transitionType=Default&
contextData=(sc.Default) (found by clicking “Search Tips” under the search bar).
99
Out of 675 contracts that contained the terms “force majeure” or “perform!
/s beyond /s control,” twenty did not have a relevant force majeure clause.
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circumstances beyond the Party’s reasonable control . . . .”
100
Furthermore, out of 655 contracts that included a force
majeure clause, 318 (48.5%) included a general one-size-fits-all
statement that seems to excuse a party from performing all its
obligations, including payment obligations, if a force majeure
renders performance impossible. To illustrate, a force majeure
clause in the sample stated, inter alia, “Neither Party shall be
liable to the other Party for any delay or omission in the
performance of any obligation hereunder, where the delay or
omission is due to any cause or conditions beyond the
reasonable control of the Party obligated to perform . . . .”
101
Each of these one-size-fits-all general statements located
in the sample does not seem to directly reflect the economic
model. This is for two central reasons. First, according to the
economic model, the identification of the superior risk bearer is
based on a fact-specific analysis.
102
Namely, the superior bearer
is the more efficient bearer of the particular risk under
particular circumstances.
103
The contextual economic model, as
opposed to the one-size-fits-all statements in the sample, neither
categorically excuses any party from performing the contract nor
unconditionally excuses the performance of any obligation.
Second, while most force majeure clauses in the sample excused
any party from performing its promise, under the economic
model a promisor should frequently not be excused, since it is
often presumed to be the superior risk bearer.
104
In addition, the results of this study also indicate that
the force majeure clauses in the sample are not a mere
boilerplate that varies marginally, if at all, among different
contracts.
105
First, from a technical perspective, the number of
words in the force majeure clauses varied, ranging from 21 to
100
KEMET Elect. Corp., Development and Cross-Licensing Agreement between
NEC TOKIN Corporation and KEMET Electronics Corporation (Form 8-K), at Ex. 10.1
art. 21.4 (May 8, 2013) (emphasis added), 2013 WL 11148290.
101
Rosewind Corp., Distribution Agreement between Ampio Pharmaceuticals,
Inc. and FBM Industria Farmaceutica, Ltda. (Form 8-K), at Ex. 10.7 art. 12.8(a) (June
8, 2015), 2015 WL 6650078 (emphasis added).
102
Cenini et al., supra note 3, at 36 (“Posner and Rosenfield demanded that a fact-
finder undertake an articulate inquiry about who is the superior risk bearer.”); MICELI, supra
note 3, at 121 (“[Optimal risk sharing] will have to be weighed on a case-by-case basis.”).
103
Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 3, at 90 (“‘Superior risk bearer’ is to be
understood here as the party that is the more efficient bearer of the particular risk in
question, in the particular circumstances of the transaction.”).
104
See supra notes 42–44 and accompanying text.
105
But see Omri Ben-Shahar & John A.E. Pottow, On the Stickiness of Default
Rules, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 651, 680 (2006) (“Complex transactions are often governed
by industry-standard boilerplate terms, which vary little, if at all, across contracts.”).
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1,126.
106
The variance in the number of words is illustrated in
Figure 1, which represents the frequency distribution
histogram of the number of words in these force majeure
clauses.
Figure 1. Frequency distribution histogram for the number of
words in force majeure clauses
This variance in the form of the force majeure clauses
may indicate that these clauses are not based on a single or
very few standardized boilerplate clauses that are merely
copied by public firms without any deliberation.
Furthermore, from a substantive perspective, the
content of the force majeure clauses in the sample varied in
many aspects. In order to illustrate the difference between the
content of the force majeure clauses, this article will focus on
three different demonstrative statements that appeared in the
force majeure clauses: (1) the excused party is required to
106
Whenever the term “force majeure” was defined in the contract, separately
from the force majeure clause, the word count included the definition of the term. See
Cubed, Inc, Oasis Marketing Solutions, LLC Master Services Agreement (Form 8-K), at
Ex. 10 art. 10(g) (May 7 2014), 2014 WL 10875509 (the force majeure clause includes
21 words and there is no contractual definition for the term force majeure). But see
PAR Petrol. Corp., Storage and Services Agreement Between Tesoro Hawaii, LLC and
Barclays Bank PLC (Form 8-K), Ex. 10 art. 1.1, 9 (Sept. 27. 2013), 2013 WL 11194145
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notify the other party about the existence of force majeure; (2)
the non-excused party has a right to terminate the contract in
case the excused party fails to perform the contract due to force
majeure; and (3) the excuse from performing the contract is
temporary, namely it is valid until the force majeure event
ceases. Table 2 shows the frequency and percentage of all the
different combinations for statements (1), (2), and (3) in the
force majeure clauses studied in this article.
Statement Combination Frequency Percentage
Statement (1) only 99 15.11%
Statement (2) only 23 3.51%
Statement (3) only 37 5.65%
Statements (1) & (2) 41 6.26%
Statements (1) & (3) 105 16.03%
Statements (2) & (3) 13 1.98%
Statements (1), (2) & (3) 114 17.4%
None of the statements (1), (2) or (3) 223 34.05%
Table 2. Frequency and Percentage of Statements 1, 2 & 3 in
Force Majeure Clauses
Finally, the results of this study show that not even one
of the contracts analyzed in this study used any term associated
with the traditional economic model, such as “superior risk
bearer,” “lowest-cost risk bearer” or “cheapest risk bearer.”
107
This result may reinforce the conclusion that parties to
commercial contracts typically prefer not to adopt the traditional
economic model. Otherwise, they would be expected to use terms
that are associated with the model in their contracts. These
terms are widely-used in published scholarly writing.
108
This
writing includes some basic educational contract law and law
and economics books, which were probably made available to
107
These results were obtained via Westlaw’s commercial law sample
agreement search engine. See supra note 92. Other terms associated with the economic
model that were not found in the sample agreements include “best risk bearer,” “optimal
risk bearer,” “reduce the risk at least cost,” “spread the risk at least cost,” “cheapest
insurer,” “cheaper insurer,” “superior risk avoider,” “superior insurer,” and “bear the risk
at least cost.”
108
As of October 1st, 2019, a search in Google Scholar’s search engine for the
term “superior risk bearer” yields 557 results. See Search for “Superior Risk Bearer,”
GOOGLE SCHOLAR, https://scholar.google.co.il/scholar?hl=iw&as_sdt=0%2C5&q=%22
superior+risk+bearer%22&btnG= [https://perma.cc/X7J4-ZS8A].
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numerous lawyers, including the ones who assisted SEC filing
companies to draft their commercial contracts.
109
III. POTENTIAL CRITICISM AND RESPONSE
The major result of this study shows that the majority of
the contracts considered do not include a force majeure clause,
thereby signaling the preference of the parties not to opt out
from the default impossibility rule.
110
Critics of this result might
argue that the parties in the sample did not contract around the
default rule due to a variety of psychological biases, mainly the
status quo bias.
111
This bias means, in our context, that contract
parties may prefer to stick to the default impossibility rule
rather than contractually opting out of that rule and switching
to the arguably more efficient economic model.
112
This concern is
unlikely in the sample of this study. As stated earlier in this
article, the sample includes only commercial contracts in which
one of the parties is a sophisticated company that is legally
required to report to the SEC. These are normally companies
with more than $10 million in assets.
113
Consequently, it is
reasonable to assume that the other party to the sample
commercial contracts of this study is likely to be a relatively
sophisticated business entity as well, given the high screening
and qualification standards implemented by sophisticated SEC-
filing companies. These sophisticated parties are probably
backed by high-volume attorneys. To illustrate, a cross-licensing
109
For the usage of the term “superior risk bearer” and the like in basic
contract law books, see, for example, HILLMAN, supra note 1, at 354–55 (using the
terms “superior risk bearer” and “superior risk avoider”). For the usage of these terms
in seminal law-and-economics books, see, for example, COOTER, JR. & ULEN, supra note
3, at 351 (using the term “lowest-cost-risk-bearer”); POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
LAW, supra note 68, at 112 (using the term “cheaper insurer”); MICELI, supra note 3, at
118 (using the “term superior risk bearer”).
110
See supra Section II.E.
111
Brett H. McDonnell, Sticky Defaults and Altering Rules in Corporate Law,
60 SMU L. REV. 383, 390 (2007) (“The basic argument is that due to a variety of
behavioral biases in decisionmaking, people will tend not to opt out of a prevailing
default rule, even though the rule may be inefficient.”).
112
Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83
CORNELL L. REV. 608, 625 (1998) (“[P]eople systematically favor maintaining a state of
affairs that they perceive as being the status quo rather than switching to an alternative
state, all else being equal.”); William Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias
in Decision Making, 1 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7, 8 (1988) (“Faced with new options,
decision makers often stick with the status quo alternative . . . .”); see also Ben-Shahar &
Pottow, supra note 105, at 682 (“It is sometimes cheap and desirable to offer terms that
differ from the default rules or the standard terms used in the market. But the proposal
of new and otherwise unfamiliar terms may also raise suspicions and scare away
potential counterparties. Default rules and the standard boilerplate terms may stick
more than we think, and more than they should.”).
113
See supra note 91.
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agreement located in the sample includes a notices clause which
states that a copy of each notice delivered during the contract
should be sent to the following leading law firms, separately
representing each party: Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP and
Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP.
114
Similarly, a
cooperation agreement in the sample includes a notices clause
under which a copy of any notice should be sent to the following
high-volume law firms: Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP, and
Debevoise & Plimpton LLP.
115
Such high-volume attorneys are
normally unlikely to continuously stick to an inefficient default
rule given their highly competitive business environment.
116
The concern that the parties in the sample stick to the
default impossibility rule since they are paralyzed by
psychological biases is unlikely for another reason. The
agreements analyzed in this study are based on contracts
contained as exhibits to Form 8-K filings with the SEC. Form 8-
K filings include information that is considered to be
“material.”
117
This information must specifically include the
entry of the filing company into a “material definitive
agreement.”
118
This agreement is defined as an agreement that
provides for obligations or rights that are “material” to the filing
company.
119
Since the contracts in the sample are important to
the filing company, it is likely that they were seriously examined
during the negotiation and drafting by companies’ personnel,
including in-house counsel, and by well-qualified outside
attorneys.
120
Such serious examination is likely to debias
114
Altra Indus. Motion Corp., Intellectual Property Cross-License Agreement
(Form 8-K), at Ex. 10.4 art. 7.c (Oct. 1, 2018), 2018 WL 04699088. Cravath, Swaine &
Moore LLP is ranked #1 according to Vault national law firm ranking and Skadden, Arps,
Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP is ranked #3 according to this ranking. See 2020 Vault Law
100, VAULT (2019), https://www.vault.com/best-companies-to-work-for/law/top-100-law-
firms-rankings [https://perma.cc/22YJ-NQ5F].
115
Blount Int’l Inc., Cooperation Agreement (Form 8-K), Ex. 10.1 art. 8 (Dec.
10, 2015), 2015 WL 8532156. Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP is ranked #7 according to
Vault national law firm ranking and Debevoise & Plimpton LLP is ranked #18
according to his ranking. See 2020 Vault Law 100, supra note 114.
116
See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Innovation in Boilerplate
Contracts: An Empirical Examination of Sovereign Bonds, 53 EMORY L.J. 929, 936
(2004) (“Our results indicate that big shifts in standardized contract terms are
associated with the high-volume attorneys . . . .”).
117
U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Office of Inv’r Educ. & Advocacy, Investor
Bulletin: How to Read an 8-K, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (May 2012),
https://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/readan8k.pdf [https://perma.cc/5URZ-Y4RV].
118
Additional Form 8-K Disclosure Requirements and Acceleration of Filing





See Eisenberg & Miller, Do Juries Add Value?, supra note 90, at 582; see also
Eisenberg & Miller, The Flight from Arbitration, supra note 90, at 349; Geoffrey P. Miller,
Bargains Bicoastal: New Light on Contract Theory, 31 CARDOZOL. REV. 1475, 1477 (2010).
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potential cognitive biases of decision makers in the company. In
addition, since contracts contained as exhibits to Form 8-K
filings are “material,” their drafting may increase the drafter’s
exposure to potential liability towards company shareholders.
This potential liability may decrease the probability of a
paralyzing status quo bias. The parties, being concerned about
the potential liability to the shareholders, are likely to make an
effort to draft an efficient force majeure clause and thereby
minimize their liability exposure. The parties are unlikely to
stick to the default impossibility rule if the superior risk bearer
model is a more efficient alternative.
Critics may further argue that the sample contracts did
not include a force majeure clause that incorporates the
economic model since uncontrollable risks, such as earthquakes
or floods, are remote and therefore do not justify spending the
costs of drafting such a clause. This critique should not be
accepted. First, the drafting costs of a clause that reflects the
economic model should not be exaggerated. The parties could
easily draft a short clause that mimics the economic model and
states: If an uncontrollable risk renders performance impossible,
the liability for non-performance should be assigned to the
superior bearer of said risk. Second, the sophisticated parties
that comprise the sample of this study, accompanied by,
presumably, highly qualified attorneys, are repeat players who
sign contracts recurrently. They could have therefore offset the
drafting costs of a short superior risk bearer clause by
internalizing the arguable benefits of the clause in their
repeated transactions.
121
Third, although uncontrollable risks
may be remote, their economic consequences on the sample
contracts examined in this study may be significant. These risks
may discharge a party, under the default impossibility rule, from
performing the contract.
122
Such discharge may have significant
economic implications on the parties since the sample contracts
are, by definition, important enough to be considered
“material.”
123
These significant potential economic implications
121
Cf. Choi & Gulati, supra note 116, at 947; see also Charles J. Goetz & Robert
E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the Interactions Between Express
and Implied Contract Terms, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 261, 304 (1985) (noting a large law firm
“may be able to confine the benefits [of contract innovation] to its own set of clients”);
Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in Corporate
Contracting (or the “Economics of Boilerplate”), 83 VA. L. REV. 713, 740 (1997) (“Atomistic
contracting may fail to yield an optimal degree of . . . innovation . . . . [L]aw firms may
mitigate these problems by diffusing some learning benefits and by internalizing network
and learning externalities.”).
122
See supra Section I.A.
123
See supra notes 117–119 and accompanying text.
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are likely to induce the parties to draft a short contract clause
that mimics the economic model if the model is efficient.
Finally, critics may argue that the sample contracts did
not include the economic superior risk bearer model since larger
companies in each contract rejected the economic model for self-
interested reasons, while ignoring the overall efficiency of the
model. According to this argument, these large companies are
normally the superior risk bearers, and therefore are likely,
under the economic model, to be liable in impossibility scenarios.
Consequently, these firms prefer to design a contract that
maintains the default impossibility doctrine, under which they
may avoid contractual liability.
The response to this critique is threefold: First, the
assumption that larger firms as such are the superior risk
bearers is questionable. As shown in this article, according to
the economic model, there are many different factors that may
indicate who is the superior risk bearer, such as who has
superior professional skills, who has superior previous
experience, and who has superior physical control over the
subject matter of the contract.
124
The size of the company is only
one of the numerous factors indicating who is the superior
bearer.
125
Second, large firms may often be unable to dictate an
inefficient force majeure contract rule given that their market
environment is often competitive. Competition may compel firms
to offer efficient force majeure contract terms.
126
Third, even
assuming that large companies are the superior risk bearers and
have monopolistic bargaining power, they would have preferred
to adopt the economic model if the model was more efficient than
the default impossibility rule. If the superior risk bearer model
was more efficient, it would minimize the costs of remote risks.
127
Hence, by adopting this model, the parties could have
maximized the overall surplus from the contract.
128
This surplus
could have been divided by the parties.
129
The large firms, having
monopolistic bargaining power, could have extracted this
124
See supra Section II.B.
125
See supra notes 82–83 and accompanying text.
126
Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and
Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. Rev. 1203, 1213 (2003) (“In a competitive market,
then, all contracts should be efficient.”); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Richard A. Posner, One-
Sided Contracts in Competitive Consumer Markets, 104 MICH. L. REV. 827, 827 (2006)
(“The usual assumption in economic analysis of law is that in a competitive market
without informational asymmetries, the terms of contracts between sellers and buyers
will be optimal . . . .”).
127
See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
128
See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
129
See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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surplus by increasing their contract price.
130
Consequently, the
large monopolistic firms could have benefitted from the
increased surplus of the superior risk model if such surplus was
indeed generated by the model.
131
CONCLUSION
The conventional economic analysis of the impossibility
doctrine suggests that when performance becomes impossible,
courts should allocate the non-performance loss to the superior
risk bearer of said loss. This article empirically tested the
economic prediction. It did so by examining how real-world
contracts allocate the risks of force majeure loss. By examining
1,926 commercial contracts filed with the SEC, this article found
that most contracting parties prefer not to adopt the traditional
economic model. More specifically, the majority of contracts did
not include a force majeure clause, thereby revealing the
preference of the parties not to contract around the default
allocation of risks provided under the legal impossibility
doctrine. In addition, even in the minority of the contracts that
included a force majeure clause, many did not seem to embrace
the economic model. The results of the study, therefore, cast
significant doubt on the validity of the existing economic
analysis of the impossibility doctrine.
130
See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird, The Boilerplate Puzzle, 104 MICH. L. REV. 933, 941
(2006) (“Even a monopolist looks for efficient warranty terms. Using inefficient terms
compromises the monopolist’s ability to extract rents. She is much better off providing
quality goods and efficient terms and charging as much as she can from them.”); Schwartz &
Scott, supra note 94, at 552–54 (“Bargaining power instead is exercised in the division of the
surplus, which is determined by the price term. Parties jointly choose the contract terms so
as to maximize the surplus, which the price may then divide unequally.”).
131
Schwartz & Scott, supra note 94, at 54.
